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Market and Welfare Effects of Mandatory
Country-Of-Origin Labeling in the Specialty Crops Sector
Market Report
Livestock and Products,
Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb.. . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef,
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, National Direct
50 lbs, FOB.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,
51-52% Lean.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., Heavy,
Wooled, South Dakota, Direct. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
Minneapolis, MN , bu. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feed

Yr
Ago

4 Wks
Ago

9/18/09

$97.31

$82.47

$83.42

117.70

110.62

110.53

111.74

100.39

99.49

160.67

142.15

142.04

68.48

46.80

50.92

42.53

*

40.00

76.53

52.31

56.91

96.62

91.25

91.25

269.62

250.27

241.57

6.40

3.94

3.56

5.27

3.11

3.02

11.41

10.48

9.46

7.98

5.12

4.61

2.09

2.01

*

Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . 190.00
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
77.50
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Premium
Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
85.00
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture,
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168.50
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture,
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
59.75
*No Market

*

*

*

82.50

*

*

81.00

85.00

32.50

35.00

Public Law 107-171 of the U.S. Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act of 2002 required country-of-origin labeling
(COOL) for beef, lamb, pork, fish, perishable agricultural
commodities (fresh and frozen fruits and vegetables) and
peanuts. While a goal of this law was to benefit domestic
consumers by allowing them to make informed consumption
decisions, the effects of COOL on the interest groups involved
have been the subject of a heated on-going debate.
Advocates of COOL1 argue the existence of an
“overwhelming” consumer support for country of origin
information and benefits that substantially outweigh the costs
of this labeling regime. Opposing groups2 have responded by
pointing out that if COOL were beneficial, the market would
have provided it voluntarily. Opposing groups have also
expressed concerns about the potential competitive
disadvantage that non-integrated producers might face due to
higher record-keeping costs, as well as about the possibility of
COOL being interpreted as a non-tariff barrier to trade at the
World Trade Organization (WTO). This reaction to COOL
resulted in the implementation of the policy for all covered
commodities, except for fish and shellfish, which was delayed
until September 30, 2008.
In addition to being scrutinized by the interest groups
involved, mandatory COOL (MCOOL) has received
considerable attention in agricultural economics literature,
with the main focus being on estimating consumers’
willingness-to-pay for labeled products, and to a lesser extent,
the costs associated with its implementation. Despite the
understanding that the implementation of MCOOL will affect
both the demand and supply sides of the regulated markets,
only a few studies have focused on analyzing the system-wide
economic effects of the policy.
The Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) of the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA), using a computable
general equilibrium model to analyze the effects of MCOOL
on all covered commodities but peanuts, projected that
MCOOL will have a negative impact on both consumer
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welfare and the domestic production and trade of covered
commodities. In particular, AMS projects that production of
fresh produce will decline by 0.15 to 0.49 percent, exports by
0.17 to 0.62 percent and imports by 0.2 to 0.26 percent. Prices
will increase by 0.11 to 0.43 percent, relative to their 2003
values over a ten-year period, causing revenues for the fruit
and vegetable industry to fall by $12 to $18 million. Two
limiting assumptions of the AMS study are that the retail
sector is perfectly competitive, and that MCOOL has no
effect on domestic consumer demand for (labeled) U.S.
grown products.
While the potential demand effects of MCOOL are
explicitly considered by a few studies, no study accounts for
imperfect competition among retailers. In addition, all existing
studies focus on the potential market effects of MCOOL on
the meat industry. Even though 23.1 percent of all covered
fruits, 16.6 percent of all covered vegetables and 9.1 percent
of all covered peanuts are of foreign origin, to our knowledge
there is no systematic analysis of the system-wide effects of
MCOOL on these crops.
Research in the Department of Agricultural Economics
at the University of Nebraska has focused on developing a
general, theory-consistent methodological framework and
systematically analyzing the market and welfare effects of the
implementation of MCOOL for specialty crops. This framework accounts for both the demand and supply effects of
MCOOL discussed earlier and their ramifications for
equilibrium prices, quantities and the welfare of the interest
groups involved.
In analyzing the market and welfare effects of MCOOL
for specialty crops, a distinct feature of our research is that it
explicitly accounts for differences in consumer preferences
for domestic and imported products, and differences in
agricultural producer efficiency and retailer market power
when buying and selling these products. Consumer and
producer heterogeneity are key components of our model and
are critical to understanding the co-existence of products with
different attributes under a mandatory labeling regime.
Finally, our study complements the applied-theoretic
framework of heterogeneous consumers and producers with
empirical econometric and simulation analysis for the U.S.
market of fresh apples.
Our research reveals that the market and welfare effects
of MCOOL are case-specific and dependent on the labeling
costs at the farm and retail levels, the strength of consumer
preference for domestic products, the market power of
retailers, the marketing margin along the supply chain and the
relative costs of imported and domestic products.
Once consumer heterogeneity is incorporated into the
analysis, previous arguments that all consumers will benefit
from the implementation of MCOOL are easily rejected. Our
analysis shows that in most cases some consumers will
benefit from the regulation, namely those with very weak and
those with very strong preference for the domestic product,
while others will lose. Producers are shown to benefit from
the regulation when the labeling costs at the farm level are
offset by a farm price increase after MCOOL introduction.

Retailers are shown to gain from MCOOL when the benefits
from being able to separate the markets for domestic and
imported products and take advantage of an existing consumer
preference for the domestic produce, outweigh the labeling
and segregation costs. Our finding that the introduction of
MCOOL creates winners and losers among consumers,
producers and retailers provides a rationalization of the widely
differing views on the desirability of MCOOL in the U.S.
Simulation results for the U.S. market of fresh apples
indicates that consumers, producers and retailers are more
likely to gain from the implementation of MCOOL under low
labeling costs and/or a strong consumer preference for
domestic apples. The minimum consumer preference for
domestic apples required for consumer welfare to increase was
shown to be higher than that required for producer welfare to
increase, which in turn, was higher than the minimum
consumer preference required for retailers’ profits to increase.
This indicates that retailers are more likely beneficiaries of
MCOOL than producers and consumers of apples.
Before concluding this article it should be pointed out
that, while our model was applied to the market of apples, the
framework of analysis developed in this study is general and
could be easily adapted to the idiosyncrasies of any relevant
product market of interest. An appropriate calibration of our
model for other specialty crops could provide policy makers
and stakeholder groups with valuable insights on the potential
effects of MCOOL regulation on different food product
markets.
Note: This article is based on the third essay of Alejandro
Plastina’s Ph.D. dissertation at the University of NebraskaLincoln.
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Among the supporters of COOL are the Minnesota Apple Growers
Association, Florida Tomato Exchange, California Tomato Growers
Exchange, Washington Growers Clearing House, Washington State Farm
Bureau, Washington Farmers Union, New York State Vegetable Growers
Association, New York National Farmers Organization, Grower Shipper
Association of Central California, California National Farmers
Organization, California Farm Bureau Federation, Nebraska Farmers
Union, Platte County Farm Bureau of Nebraska, American Corn Growers
Assoc. of Nebraska, Nebraska Grange and the Nebraska Women
Involved in Farm Economics.
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According to WalMart Watch, the top five groups with the highest
lobbying expenditures against COOL are the American Farm Bureau
Federation, Grocery Manufacturers of America, Cargill, Inc., Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. and National Food Processors Association.

